The Goal of Legal Education: Promoting Logical Analysis at the Expense of Moral Development by Evans, Julia Kingsley
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 20
Number 3 Spring, 1990 Article 2
1990
The Goal of Legal Education: Promoting Logical
Analysis at the Expense of Moral Development
Julia Kingsley Evans
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Evans, Julia Kingsley (1990) "The Goal of Legal Education: Promoting Logical Analysis at the Expense of Moral Development,"
University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 20 : No. 3 , Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol20/iss3/2
The Goal Of Legal Education: 
Promoting Logical Analysis at the Expense 
of Moral Development 
What effect does legal education have 
in shaping the legal profession? Does 
legal education over-emphasize the role 
of the advocate, leaving the primary 
moral objective to the workings of the 
judicial system? Only a few studies have 
measured the impact of legal training on 
individual attitudes as a reflection of the 
nature and adequacy of professional 
training. Much of the material is anec-
dotal in nature and not supported by 
objective findings. Nevertheless, this ar-
ticle will examine the limited contribu-
tion that legal education has provided to 
the moral development of future profes-
sionals. 
Legal education prepares students to 
engage in legal analYSiS, construct legal 
arguments, and understand legal doc-
trines, but it does not train students to 
examine moral positions. 1 Students are 
taught the necessary skills and knowl-
edge to further a client's interests, pro-
vided that as lawyers they do not do what 
the law ~rohibits lawyers from doing for 
clients. 
Legal education operates with a num-
ber of working assumptions. One of 
these assumptions is that the essence of 
legal education is to teach "legal think-
ing" and the better such thinking, the 
better the lawyer.3 Another assumption 
is that moral disposition is a fixed charac-
teristic, the development of which oc-
curs early i~ life, substantially predating 
law school. Additionally, it is assumed 
that once a sound moral disposition is 
acquired it remains constant without any 
reinforcement.5 Thus, the examination 
or reinforcement of moral sensitivities is 
not regarded as a necessary subject for 
legal education. 
Yet there are influences in legal educa-
tion that undermine a student's sound 
moral disposition. Robert Redmount 
noted that when a student enters law 
school, her moral disposition is generally 
untested by "the morally relevant chal-
lenge of coping with substantial power 
and making critical decisions in real 
life. "6 
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Upon entering law school, students 
expect certainty and predictability from 
the study of law.7 But during the first 
year, many students find themselves frus-
trated by the "Socratic method" and ill-
equipped for the emf.hasis placed upon 
analytical reasoning. The late professor 
Karl llewellyn told students, "the hardest 
job of the first year is to lop off your 
common sense, to knock your ethics into 
temporary anesthesia. Your view of so-
cial policy, your sense of justice - to 
knock these out of you along with woozy 
thinking .... "9 The law student learns that 
it is necessary to set morals aside while 
developing analytical skills in law school. 
Thus, in legal education, "whether this 
doctrine is a matter of philosophy or 
merely an educational device, morals are 
considered irrelevant, therefore morals 
become irrelevant."lO Robert Redmount 
wrote: 
In law school, the student learns 
that moral considerations are not 
decisive either in the analysiS or re-
sult that attends legal reasoning or 
thinking like a lawyer. The attitude 
is reinforced by the cultivation of a 
learning experience in which the 
student's personal reactions are 
deemed irrelevant to the essential 
character of legal decision making 
and legal education. Legal education 
is concerned solely with the 
student's intellectual capacity 
rather than his emotional or moral 
capacities. Additionally, there is the 
universal commitment in law to an 
adversary process, which is not 
without moral consequence for the 
practitioner .u 
Law school teaches students how to 
push the law to its extreme, as well as 
emphasizing that one's responsibility is 
to the client and not to morality.12 After 
all, it is winning that counts. Other fac-
tors which encroach on the sense of 
morality are the adversary systems which 
dictate that you find any way to win for 
your client; the threat of malpractice 
suits which dictates that a lawyer must 
do everything within the law for his cli-
ent; the pressure of corporate work and 
its search for legal loopholes; and the 
ability of lawyers to rationalize their own 
unethical behavior. One student was sur-
prised that more attorneys have not been 
disbarred. 13 
One reason for the lack of ethical in-
quires in law school is that the focus is 
on teaching students to "think like law-
yers" through extensive use of the case 
and Socratic methods. The Socratic 
method of teaching law was originally 
adopted to help students discover the 
proper ethical posture through an exam-
ination of a series of complex fact situa-
tions, each arguably calling for a different 
professional and ethical response.14 The 
traditionalist view, still representative of 
current thinking, is to emphasize the pro-
cess rather than substantive goals: "The 
secret is, in other words, to concentrate 
on the process, and not try to determine 
in advance what results should emerge 
from the process in the form of specific 
solutions. If we do things the right waY5 
we are likely to do the right thing." 
Thus, as analytical skills emerge from the 
Socragc dialectic, so will moral teach-
ings.l 
Through the routine of the Socratic 
method, the law professor constructs an 
every day reality for the law student that 
"blunts the students' ability to invest the 
learning experience with personal and 
social meaning. The students go from 
one day to the next without thinking, 
without recognizing the power and influ-
ence they have ~iven the structure of 
their daily lives." 
Socratic teaching can be considered a 
form of ritualization.18 Psychologist Eric 
Erikson suggests that ritualization in man 
consists of "an agreed upon interplay 
between at least two persons who repeat 
it at meaningful intervals and in recurring 
contexts; and that this interplay should 
have adaptive value for the respective 
egos of both participants." 19 Absent hard 
data to this effect, one can only speculate 
that students do not find that the Socratic 
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method is ego enhancing. A sample of 
student responses at Harvard Law School 
in the 1970's concerning the Socratic 
method: 
(a) "The Socratic method is terribly 
abused, particularly when the 
professor obviously knows 
where he is going and you're 
like a trained porpoise, trying 
to catch the bait." 
(b) "You get sick of it and lots of 
kids stop going to class." 
(c) "The Socratic method is great 
for a couple of hours, but then 
you begin to tune out, it's just 
too exhausting." 
(d) "The Socratic method is excel-
lent, it means humiliation, but 
1 think it is great." 
(e) "Sometimes perfectly good an-
swers are not accepted." 
(1) "The scary aspect of the Socratic 
method is that it's not really like 
being a lawyer; it's like being 
on the witness stand - you can 
be led into a position that 
makes you feel intimidated. I'm 
sure the intention is to disillu-
sion you, to put you down, to 
get you down where you 
should be." 
(g) "I wonder if the Socratic 
method is good for me; I often 
don't know after class which 
are the relevant pOints. I've 
been so scared in class I'd 
rather give a bad answer than 
an answer that mllJ' lead to fur-
ther discussion. ,,2 
Student values and moral assumptions 
are attacked in the classroom through the 
Socratic method, so that the process of 
critical analysis is not just an intellectual 
exercise, but more of an ideological as-
sault.21 "Even the average law school pro-
fessor can be a very persuasive critic, the 
thrust of his traditional approach is seen 
as a serious threat to convictions which 
are central to the student's personal iden-
tity and his motivation for pursuing legal 
education. »22 One student stated, 
We became a group of 140 or so 
beings, extremely isolated from 
each other, from others in the 
school and outside of it. Our isola-
tion and the demanding work 
schedule numb and dull whatever is 
within which enables us to look at 
people, things and our immediate 
surroundings in a fresh, inquisitive 
and healthy way. The experience 
retards our ability to think reflec-
tively and creatively. Our minds 
begin to function more mechani-
cally, and we are so busy jockeying 
for position in the middle of the 
pack that we are reacting more than 
acting, and reflection on who we are 
and where we have been with our 
lives is a l~ in which we do not 
induIge.23 
Professor Andrew S. Watson maintains 
that as a result of anxiety produced in the 
classroom, many law students, particu-
larly during the first year, "progressively 
surround themselves with a suit of psy-
chological armor that makes them more 
and more impervious to the emotional 
aspects of most, if not all, situations. »2 
One defense that students develop is that 
of cynicism, where a person may appear 
totally without social conscience and 
may be labeled caUous.25 However, the 
student who relies on this defense mech-
anism is in fact attempting to silence "the 
powerful and primitive conscience Iyj 
separating his feeling from his ideas.» 
((Student values 
and moral 
assumptions are 
attacked . .. 
through the 
Socratic method, n 
Watson notes, 
it is my contention that law school 
education explicitly shapes the 
character development of law stu-
dents in certain ways which are det-
rimental to efficient professional 
performance. The character adapta-
tion is necessary in order to resolve 
and escape the tensions of the class-
room. The principal characterologi-
cal development change is to 
become "unemotional.» In addition 
to being told that this is a desirable 
attribute to develop, it is also a reac-
tion to classroom anxiety . . ... 
Marked stoicism and emotional un-
responsiveness may be regarded as 
characterological defenses against 
underlying emotions. Intellectual 
means in the form of cynicism about 
the human aspects of the lawyer's 
role may also be used to accomplish 
this purpose. This cynicism is a kind 
of characterological defense which 
enables a person to avoid the neces-
sity of caring about people with its 
intrinsic capacity to stir up anxi-
ety.27 
Watson recommends "sensitizing» the 
classroom learning experience. 28 For ex-
ample, 
cynicism or excessive casualness 
about important legal problems 
should never be overlooked by the 
instructor. To do so is to run the risk 
of reinforcing the defenses evi-
denced by these manifestations 
through tacit approval. Likewise, ev-
idence of psychological avoidance 
of conflict issues should be ex-
plored rigorously and brought out in 
class discussion. This is best done in 
an atmosphere of acceptance rather 
than in the context of moralizing.29 
Watson further notes that moralizing 
tends to increase the camouflage about 
cynical attitudes. 30 
One study indicated that second and 
third year students felt that they had be-
come more cynical, less humanitarian, 
and more hardened, during their law 
school experience.31 The author noted 
that students' comments reflected a 
struggle with one particular socialization 
demand: "the demand that the student 
represent the interests of a client, even if 
those interests were antithetical to the 
student's personal values and his identi-
fications. »32 Another commentator 
noted, 
If one gets a client whom he knows 
is guilty, the question [is] whether 
that man deserves the best defense. 
Legal ethics [may] justify that - but 
what ethics is it to get a child mur-
derer off? or to prepare a defense for 
[Nixon]? The ethics course in law 
school seems to be aimed at telling 
you how close to the edge you can 
get. All is justified on the basis of 
doing the best for one's client. Com-
mented one [student], 'I hope I do 
not get to the point where I will do 
anything . .33 
The student must confront the conflict 
presented between performance ex-
pected in the lawyer role and perfor-
mance congruent with the sense of 
self.34 This type of conflict produces 
student "cynicism» and "hardness. »35 
Likewise, the process of learning to 
argue both sides of an issue produces 
similar results; some second year stu-
dents maintain that they no longer hgve 
strong convictions about anything.3 
One would assume that the student 
with a solid moral disposition will survive 
all the risks and temptations associated 
with the rigors of law school. 37 
Redmount, however, proffers that moral 
dispositions may not survive well when 
left unattended and unnurtured.38 He 
suggests that there are measures that can 
serve to secure sound moral dispositions: 
Judgements of value that recognize 
the legitimacy of moral concerns, 
provide the means for moral analy-
sis, and accept the validity and even 
the primacy of moral experience 
and judgements need to be devel-
oped in legal education. The answer 
here calls for something more sub-
stantial than modest intellectual in-
quiry into the ethical rules that are 
posited to govern professional con-
duct .... Student learning must be 
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attended by moral questions that 
temper the purely intellectual char-
acter of law learning. Extrinsic re-
wards in learning need to be based 
on consciousness of issues and 
judgements that are not largely con-
fined to intellectual analysis alone. 39 
Redmount also relies on the teacher-
student relationship as a necessary con-
duit to increasing the moral and ethical 
dimensions of the learning experience. 
Coupled with the Socratic and adversary 
method of the classroom, there is a real 
or implied one-up-ness in the role of the 
professor.40 Moreover, professors strive 
to maintain a value-neutral arena because 
they fear that bringing their own ideolog-
ical commitments into the classroom will 
destroy the structured fabric of legal ed-
ucation.41 Redmount, however, notes 
that 9.1 emphasizing Hohfeldian con-
cepts'i- of duties, rights, privileges, pow-
ers, n<Kiuties, and no-rights, professors 
can raise the consciousness of moral and 
ethical considerations in the class-
room.43 
Additionally, Redmount suggests 
three conditions in the teacher-student 
relationship which are necessary for ef-
fective learning: 
(1) Unconditional Positive Regard-
where the teacher, in a kind of 
acceptance without conditions 
or demands, expresses an ac-
cepting and caring attitude to-
ward the student. 
(2) Empathic Understanding 
where the teacher puts himself 
in the students' shoes. 
(3) Congruence - where the feel-
ing, understanding and exhib-
ited behavior between the 
student and teacher are consis-
tent.44 
Although somewhat emotionally ori-
ented, Redmount notes that the moral 
dimension is not entirely separate from 
emotional and rational considera-
tions.45 
In Le~gl Education and the Good 
Lawyer, Richard Wasserstrom writes 
that the concept of the "good lawyer" -
one who is technically proficient in the 
law and will do "anything" for a client 
short of violating the rules of professional 
responsibility - is consistently reflected in 
the content and design of the law school 
curriculum, in the way courses are taught 
and in the evaluation of students.47 Al-
though legal education may be doing a 
reasonably good job of realizing educa-
tional goals, Wasserstrom maintains that 
there are problems with this concept of 
the good lawyer.48 
First, the prevailing view of a lawyer as 
an amoral facilitator of others' ends 
seems to endorse indifference. 
It is in general irresponsible and 
often, as a result, wrong for one 
person knowingly, to say nothing of 
enthUSiastically, to assist another in 
securing some end or objective 
without seriously considering the 
moral worth - the goodness or bad-
ness - of that objective. The moral 
problem is increased, not lessened, 
when the assistance is provided for 
money rather than friendship or 
compassion.49 
Second, this conception of the good 
lawyer's role places him or her in a sim-
plified, largely amoral world of thought 
and action in which ordinary concerns 
and demands of morality no longer mat-
ter or have weight. 50 This invites the risk 
of immorality on the part of the lawyer. 51 
Third, the attributes cultivated in the 
adversarial role, such as competitive-
ness, aggressiveness and ruthlessness on 
(([TJhe study of 
ethics . .. conflicts 
with the study of 
law, which 
promotes logical 
analysis. n 
behalf of the client, are acquired at the 
expense of cooperativeness and compas-
sion.52 This creates a moral problem be-
cause the behavior and thinking one 
utilizes in his or her career is not easily 
detachable during the remainder of his 
or her life.53 
Wasserstrom maintains that a sound 
legal education should include a deep 
attachment to and concerns for moral 
worthiness and rightness and a corre-
sponding sense of responsibility for the 
justness of the legal system. 
Wasserstrom's concept ofthe good law-
yer would, therefore, include, 
(1) Care always to assure just and 
decent treatment of clients and 
all other persons affected by 
the client; 
(2) Concern always manifested 
about the justness and good-
ness of the choices made con-
cerning the claims vindicated 
and defended; 
(3) Interest and concern for the 
justness and goodness of the 
existing system of law, seen as 
one of Significant responsibili-
ties of all those who have been 
trained for the practice of 
law.54 
Shaffer asserts that the study of ethics 
- the science of thinking about morals - is 
an approach that conflicts with the study 
of law, which promotes logical analy-
sis. 55 Shaffer offers the following anec-
dotes: (1) the late Dean William Prosser 
noted that the owner of a dog is not liable 
to the person the dog bites, unless he 
knows the dog's propensity to bite peo-
ple, thus the law permits one free bite; 
(2) Prosser also examined a case where 
a man was held not liable for making a 
lewd proposition to a woman and con-
cluded that the law finds no harm in the 
asking; (3) Justice Holmes stated that in 
deciding whether to sterilize a mentally 
deficient person, deference should be 
given to a state legislature because it may 
well decide that three generation of im-
beciles are enough.56 
One difficulty Shaffer finds with the 
attempt to teach both ethics and legal 
analysis is that law professors would rea-
sonably be expected to show familiarity 
with both approaches: "It is not enough 
to deal with moral assertions by legal 
logic or wit, one must know something 
about Aristotle, Kant, Niebuhr, and the 
Bible."57 
Another problem is that since law stu-
dents are learning a "cultural disrespect 
for principles," it would be difficult to 
examine moral assertions at the same 
time. 58 Shaffer suggests that students 
may lack respect for moral principles or 
be afraid to develop respect for them.59 
However, this disrespect for principles is 
necessary for students to develop, be-
cause as lawyers and judges thJ&. must 
not be awed by legal principles. "Legal 
principles are explanations for results. 
They are not the stuff of the law, and one 
who proposes to deal with the stuff of 
the law has to go through principles to 
fact and results. A lawyer has to write 
new principles to fit the needs of his 
clients. "61 
During the 1988 Annual Meeting of the 
Association of American Law Schools, 
the Honorable Harry Edwards, Circuit 
Judge for the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia, ad-
dressed the topic of "The Role of Leg&l 
Education in Shaping the Profession." 2 
Judge Edwards cited a 1986 ABA report 
which criticized legal education in the 
areas of ethics and profeSSionalism. The 
report suggests that law schools confront 
students with hard ethical issues: "a law 
school's impact on the professional de-
velopment of its students should extend 
beyond simply teaching legal rules" .63 In 
recommending structured reforms, 
Judge Edwards stated, 
It is essential that law students learn 
not only how to argue an appeal, for 
example, but also how to consider 
whether to bring one in the first 
place. They must know that there 
are serious decisions -nontechnical, 
but professional in the deepest 
sense of the word - to be made in 
every such situation. They must 
know that in making such decisions 
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they not only serve a client but also 
affect the system of justice. If stu-
dents do not know this on leaving 
law school, there is nothing to pre-
vent them from succumbing to the 
pressure of generating billable 
hours - and making "professional" 
decisions accordingly. If most law 
graduates enter practice without 
ever having faced such questions in 
any meaningful way in law school, 
then it is certain that they will never 
reflect on such questions. They will 
simply not fInd the time or the in-
centive to do so once they have 
begun practice. Only the law school 
experience can offer the student the 
luxury of time ~or reflection on eth-
ical problems. 
One recommendation Judge Edwards 
makes is placing more emphasis on 
courses such as Alternative Dispute Rets 
olutions as well as clinical programs. 5 
Judge Edwards maintains that graduating 
law students today are less prepared for 
law &f!ctice than those of his genera-
tion. Thus, greater emphasis should be 
placed on practical courses. 
Derek Bok, President of Harvard Uni-
versity, agrees with Judge Edwards. Pre~ 
ident Bok argues that law schools, by 
emphasizing traditional skills designed to 
prepare a "student for legal combat," 
have helped to produce a legal system 
that is among the most exoensive and 
least efficient in the world.1S7 President 
Bok recommends more courses in meth-
ods of mediation and negotiation, but 
ultimately he suggests a greater calling 
for law schools: 
Law schools can also help to create 
new institutions more efficient than 
traditional law fIrms in delivering 
legal services to the poor and middle 
class. As in medicine, these organi-
zations will benefIt if they are linked 
to a university so that they can offer 
teaching opportunities and intellec-
tual stimulation to their attorneys 
while drawing upon the services of 
secon~ and third year law stu-
dents. 
Besides improving the public image of 
lawyers, this appoach would also pro-
vide an opportunity to give students a 
larger vision of their future calling, a 
sense of what life as a lawyer might 
entail, and an awareness of problems of 
the profession 6which students could 
help to resolve. 9 
Yet the focus of legal education re-
mains on "winning" and on developing a 
student's capacity to "think like a law-
yer." While the system succeeds in meet-
ing this narrow purpose, it fails to stress 
or encourage exploration of moral prop-
ositions as an important part of profe~ 
sional education. Questions of ethics and 
morality are ultimately left to be decided 
by the workings of the legal system. 
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